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Asia’s Disappearing Daughters
June 13, 2011 in Uncategorized by jwasserstrom | Permalink

By Jeffrey Wasserstrom

Last week witnessed the publication of Mara
Hvistendahl’s Unnatural Selection: Choosing Boys Over Girls, and the Consequences of a
World Full of Men (Public Affairs, 2011), and over the weekend my take on the book appeared
online at the recently relaunched Asian Review of Books. That review is reposted here with the
kind permission of the ARB, almost exactly as it ran there. Those who are interested in
learning more about Hvistendahl’s arguments after reading my essay can, of course, buy the
book, but U.S.-based followers of the blog have another option as well: catch one of the public
events (including a June 28 L.A. stop) on this list.
Why are there so many more boys than girls in many parts of China—and how worrisome is
this phenomenon?
Freelance journalist Mara Hvistendahl had questions like these on her mind several years ago,
when she set out to do interviews in Suining, a county midway between Beijing and Shanghai
that for much of the past had been “notable only for its ordinariness,” as she puts it. Suining,
she claims, is the kind of place where even the food veers away from extremes (dishes are “a
little spicy, a little salty, a little sweet”, neither fiery like those of Sichuan nor as elegant as
those of Guangdong) and even the best known historical celebrity started out a man “of
humble peasant origins” (before leading a popular rebellion more than two millennia ago that
made him Emperor).
What drew her to this otherwise ordinary setting was one extraordinary thing: a gender ratio
that, even for China, was horribly off-kilter. In 2007, some 150 boys were being born for
every 100 girls (slightly more boys than girls tend to be born globally, but anything over about
a 105 to 100 split is considered a significant departure from the norm). The fruits of her time
in Suining, where she heard tales confirming that sonograms followed by sex-selective
abortions rather than female infanticide were at the root of the problem, was a superbVirginia
Quarterly article called “Half the Sky: How China’s Gender Imbalance Threatens Its Future”
(2008). Material from that work of reportage, supplemented by an impressive amount of
reading (in scholarly publications in multiple fields and about many lands), plus travels to far
flung locales (European and American, as well as Asian), has now been reworked into an
ambitious, provocative, and carefully-crafted book, Unnatural Selection: Choosing Boys Over
Girls, and the Consequences of a World Full of Men.

Some of her travels were part of an effort to piece together parts of the Chinese gender ratio
story, but Hvistendahl (full disclosure: she’s an author I met in Shanghai two years ago, have
been interviewed by occasionally, have shared a stage with at a UC Irvine event, and have
interviewed for China Beat and theHuffington Post) also moved outside of China for other
reasons. Taking her cue from a milestone 1990 New York Review of Books essay by Nobel
Prize winning economist Amartya Sen, “More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing”, which
deals as much with India as with the PRC, she was determined to bring into the picture
various parts of Asia (and beyond: Albania gets a look in) where skewed ratios resembling if
not quite matching those in Suining can also be found. In addition, she is concerned with
ripple effects: the way that a disproportionate number of young males growing up in one area
can lead to new kinds of sex trafficking and marriage migration pulling young women out of
another. One of the book’s most riveting sections, for example, tells of the tragic plight of
Vietnamese woman kidnapped and taken across the border into China.
Despite its wide reach, it is the China questions sketched out above that lie at the heart of
many sections of Unnatural Selection, for the PRC is the Asian country in which the book’s
widely-traveled author has spent the most time and also the Asian land about which she has
read most deeply. And this is all to the good, not just because of China’s size and economic
significance, but also because an inquiry into Chinese demographic dilemmas has a special
timeliness right now. For there is a debate underway within the PRC about whether the
moment has finally come to abandon or dramatically scale what is typically called the “onechild family policy”—a somewhat misleading term, since for most of its history there have
been some kinds of couples (e.g., member of ethnic minorities) who have been allowed to
have more than one offspring.
***
The questions about China that Hvistendahl grapples with, though very much of the moment,
are not new—and were not even new when Sen wrestled with them in his oft-cited look at the
missing women of Asia two decades ago. I am keenly aware of the longevity of the questions,
as they were on my mind more than a quarter-of-a-century ago at the very start of my
academic career. In the early 1980s, working toward a master’s in East Asian Studies at
Harvard, the then-novel reports of Chinese villages with 110 or 120 boys for every 100 girls
fascinated me. An effort to work through the phenomenon led to my first research paper using
Chinese-language sources (mostly letters to the editor of a PRC women’s magazine dealing
with prejudice against daughters and mothers who failed to bear sons), and to my first
publication: an article on “Resistance to the One-Child Family” in the June 1984 issue of the
interdisciplinary journalModern China. I remain proud of that piece, which tried to clear up
some basic misconceptions about the dynamic of Chinese birth control efforts early in the
post-Mao era, but a decade or so on, I realized how much richer my discussion could have
been had I had access to Sen’s article with its pairing of China and India. I now realize that an
even more multifaceted handling of the theme is possible if one follows the chains of argument
that Hvistendahl explores, such as bringing to the surface the complex role that Western
“population bomb” theories and development discourses of the 1960s, as well as technological
breakthroughs, have played in the tilting toward sons in much of the developing world.
Before saying more about this important aspect of Hvistendahl’s book, it’s worth recapping
briefly the state of play in early discussions of what, for simplicity’s sake, I’ll refer to by its
standard name: the one-child policy. What intrigued me in the early 1980s was how
differently, in reports on this subject, skewed sex ratios and the preference for sons over
daughters more generally were handled in the Chinese as opposed to the international press,
and how little was said in either set of writings about how economic reforms had altered the
material benefits of having a son as opposed to a daughter.
What was the thrust of most Western coverage of the Chinese birth control drive at the time?
One key theme was that the one-child policy was being enforced via measures that were
“draconian” (a favorite word of columnists, in particular). Another, in addition to women being
forced to have abortions (the most sensational revelation of the early 1980s), was that there

had been a resurgence of female infanticide. These phenomena became so intertwined in
some discussions of the topic that readers could easily conclude that the shockingly high
gender imbalance in some counties was part and parcel of government policy, or at the very
least, take for granted that the Chinese Communist Party had no concern with male-female
ratios, as long as rigid birth quota targets were hit.
In the Chinese press, on the other hand, each sign of a preference for sons over daughters
was presented as flouting, or at least failing to accept, official policy. The one-child family
drive was predicated on the notion that couples should be happy with a single child, whether
male or female. The standard visual propaganda used to promote the policy was of a mother,
a father and a daughter as a happy and complete nuclear family unit. Indications of a strong
preference relating to the sex of a child, as well as any mistreatment of women for bearing
daughters (reflecting the belief that a wife had a responsibility to provide her husband and his
family with a male heir and that she somehow determined the sex of the fetus she carried)
were condemned in official publications. The magazine Zhongguo funu (Chinese Women),
which I drew from in my first article, ran heartbreaking first-person accounts of mistreated
mothers of daughters, who had been verbally or physically abused by their husbands and one
or both of his parents, as well as explanations by the editors of why this behavior was wrong.
To condemn these mothers, the magazine claimed, was to act in backward and immoral way:
it was to fall pray to “feudal” old patriarchal notions that had no place in the New China. It was
also to be “unscientific” in assigning “blame” for an unwanted outcome—the editors sometimes
stressed—backing this up with references to fact that the chromosomal make-up of the
father’s sperm, rather than anything related to the mother, leads some children to be born
male, others female.
One of the main points I made in my article in Modern China about the enduring preference
for sons in the PRC was a fairly simple one, which—had I written the article a bit later—I might
have linked to a phrase Bill Clinton would make famous: “It’s the economy, stupid.” What was
left out of the picture in both Western reports (that attributed the problem to official birth
control policy) and Chinese commentaries (that treated all gender bias as a holdover of
pernicious traditional beliefs) was how having a boy as opposed to a girl was likely to affect
the living standard of a rural family. For all the experiments in social engineering Mao Zedong
introduced from the 1940s through the 1970s, including some designed to do away with
gender bias, the Chinese government had never focused on uprooting the general pattern of
rural women marrying into their husband’s village.
When marriage works this way, the general rule is that female children cost their natal family
resources in the short term and then, once grown, contribute their labor to, and bring
offspring, into the household of their in-laws. Grown sons, by contrast, end up not just
working for but also bringing new children into their birth family. During the heyday of
collectivization under Mao, this differential did not matter nearly as much as it once had, since
the family ceased for a time being the most important economic unit. Crucially, though, two of
the main early post-Mao policies were a shift toward allowing farming families to keep profits
from land they worked and the drive to limit births. In other words, there was what Mao would
have called (as this was one of his favorite terms) a fundamental “contradiction”: people were
told it was inappropriate to prefer sons to daughters at precisely the moment that, in addition
to whatever lingering old gender bias had remained in place, a new economic incentive
favoring male over female children was coming into play.
***
One of the many accomplishments of Hvistendahl’s book is to show that there have been
additional “contradictions” at work in the pan-Asian “missing women” phenomenon. For
simplicity’s sake, we can boil these down to contradictions linked to visions of what it means
to be “modern” and contradictions tied to technology.
A central element in the first sort of contradiction pre-dates the implementation of the onechild family policy. It goes back to Western writings in the 1950s and 1960s that harped on
the apocalyptical implications of high birth-rates in the developing world.

Here, in a much stripped down form, is my paraphrasing of the way Hvistendahl lays out the
situation, in sections that owe and acknowledge a considerable debt to Columbia University
historian Matthew Connelly’s important book, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control
World Population (Harvard University Press, 2008):
If only, some proponents of “population bomb” thinking argued, methods could be found to
ensure that couples outside of the West embraced more “modern” small family ideals. Given
the strong bias toward sons in many places, one thing needed was to make sure that couples
who kept having daughters would not just keep trying and trying to have a male offspring. To
solve the problem of overpopulation, the key would be to convince couples that having more
than two children was no longer feasible (the planet could not take having people procreate at
more than just this replacement level)—and allow them to be confident that one of those
children would be a son (e.g., if their first child was a girl, give them much better than a 105
to 100 chance that the second would be a boy). But something was left out of the equation
here: if a magical means could suddenly appear to guarantee that hundreds of millions of
couples wanting to stop at two children, who had a girl first, had a boy next, the result would
be a dangerously off kilter demographic picture. There would soon be an incredibly large
number of men who would be expected to marry (and for the most part would want to marry),
but would grossly outnumber eligible women.
Turning to technology, recent decades have seen moves toward—or full realization of—various
sex selection methods that can alter the odds dramatically in favor of having a son or
daughter, depending on a couple’s wishes. These range from the relatively low-tech
(sonogram machines that reveal the sex of a fetus) to methods so high-tech they border on
science fiction (fiddling with genes to produce babies with sought-after traits). The
contradiction here is that, while reports of skewed gender ratios in China in the 1980s
sometimes focused on the re-emergence of a very old method of diminishing the number of
girls in an area (infanticide by drowning), the single biggest factor in the current tilt toward
boys in many parts of Asia has been sex-selective abortion by couples who have learned, after
amniocentesis or more often a sonogram, that a pregnancy (in many cases, a second or third
one in a son-less family) would lead to a daughter’s birth.
What we have here is a messy combination of factors that take us far beyond a clash between
“traditional” values and state policies. We find instead situations in which old preferences are
reinforced by new practices (e.g., the economic reforms in the Chinese countryside) and can
be acted upon by using new machines. There is no “typical” Asian couple responsible for
contributing to the large number of “excess men” (males growing up in areas with too few
female age mates), but Hvistendahl shows that, when imagining one, we might do well to
conjure up a couple striving to embrace a modern ideal (only having two children) and making
use of modern technologies, rather than let our minds think only of a “traditional” and
“backward” pair who need to be educated by the state to have their ideas brought up to date.
***
Unnatural Selection does much more than complicate the picture of the causes of skewed sex
ratios. What I have not touched upon are the parts of the book that delve into past and
present visions of the problems that can be caused by populations with disproportionate
numbers of men—sections that creatively move between quotes relating to the American “Wild
West” (a violent setting where women were scarce) and material drawn from scholarly
monographs on Chinese peasant rebellions in which “bare sticks” (bachelors without marriage
prospects) played crucial roles. Also deserving of mention is Hvistendahl’s intriguing analysis
of the links between efforts to be able to select for sex and to select for other traits (from
immunity to particular diseases to specific facial features and skin tones)—an analysis that
takes her from East and South Asia to a Southern California clinic.
Neither have I described her clever method of keeping a book of this kind lively and readable:
making sure that each chapter features a life story (this is revealed in chapter titles such as
“The Demographer”, “The Parent”, “The Geneticist”, “The Prostitute”, and “The Bachelor”);

nor, indeed, the tricky moral line she walks on a hot-button issue, staking out a nuanced
position on abortion that reflects her commitments as a feminist and concern about the ill
effects of easy access to techniques that can end a pregnancy that is unwanted because of the
sex of a fetus.
It is a book that does a great many things well. In the end, though, its most important takeaway point is likely to be the need—when thinking about the causes and “the consequences of
a world full of men” (to borrow a term from her subtitle) —to remember that the situation
involves many strands. I know that, after reading it, I will never think about Asia’s
disappearing daughters in the same way again. And to pay the author a much higher
compliment, I would wager that, after reading Unnatural Selection, Amartya Sen might well
feel tempted to say the exact same thing.

